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This study attempts to explore and empirically examine the impact earnings management has on 
earnings conservatisms. I argue that in the practice of income-decreasing earning management, 
managers more likely accelerate the recognition of bad news in earnings than good news and it thus 
actually influences firms' earnings conservatism by biasing the degree of firms' earnings conservatism 
upwards. While in the practice of income-increasing earnings management, managers more likely 
speed up the recognition of good news in earnings while defer the recognition of bad news in earnings 
and it thus actually affects firms' earnings conservatism by biasing the degree of firms' earnings 
conservatism downwards. I also argue that the firms which engage in income-decreasing earnings 
management tend to be more conservative than the firms which engage in income-increasing earnings 
management. 
 
In the empirical examination, I use the incremental bad news effect in Basu (1997) earnings 
regression model to measure the degree of earnings conservatism. Discretionary accruals is used to 
proxy for earnings management. I partition the full sample into income-decreasing sub sample and 
income-increasing sub sample according to the sign of firms' discretionary accruals. The results show: 
(1) In Basu's regression model, the negative discretionary accruals sub sample obtains the higher 
incremental coefficient on bad news than the full sample, while the negative discretionary accruals 
sub sample obtains the lower one than the full sample. (2) In the combined regression model, the 
estimated coefficient, which captures the incremental earnings' response to bad news for the negative 
discretionary accruals sub sample firms, is significantly positive. The results therefore support my 
hypotheses. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Financial reporting, on the one hand, is regarded as a mechanism to convert firms' 
inside information to the outside financial information users. It improves the 
efficiency of capital markets through supplying useful financial information to 
investors who rely on it to make investment decisions. Investors require the firms' 
managers to provide relevant financial information, which can best reflect firms' 
current operations and future prospects. On the other hand, financial reporting offers 
accounting measures, which are related to reported accounting number for 
managerial performance evaluation purpose. Net income is a typical example of 
accounting measure. Accounting measures provided by financial statements are 
normally tied to managers' bonus plan as a stimulus for generating more value for 
firms' shareholders.  
 
However, there exists the conflict of interests between managers and firms' 
shareholders (investors) and agency theory attributes it to the separation of firms' 
ownership and control. In addition, due to the existence of information asymmetry, 
managers have more private knowledge of firms' financial conditions. This obvious 
advantage of firms' inside information over shareholders enables managers to hide 
certain information or to report biased accounting information to investors or other 
outside information users for various incentives.  
 
Accounting conservatisms in financial reporting arises primarily for the purpose to 
facilitate external parties such as investors, lenders and standard setter to govern or 
monitor the firm's operations. Firstly, for the purpose to protect investors and other 
stakeholders' interests since the existence of interest conflict between managers and 
investors (or lenders). It mitigates the moral hazard and adverse selection problems 
between managers and investors (or lenders) via avoiding managers biasing earnings 
upwards and thus mislead investors or lenders' investment or borrowing decisions. 
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Secondly, shareholders are likely misled by fraud or misstatement in released 
financial reporting. If fraud or misstatement is detected in financial reporting, firm 
would be sued by shareholders. Conservatism arises due to this possible 
shareholders' litigation. Conservatism reduces firms' expected potential litigation cost 
because understatement of net assets and earnings would generate less litigation risk 
than overstatement of them (Watts, 1993). Thirdly, income tax as a nexus links 
financial reporting system to tax system since its calculation is tied to firm's reported 
earnings. This link between tax system and financial reporting system generates the 
demand for conservatism. Conservatism benefits firms by reducing the present value 
of firms' tax liabilities when taxable income is tied to reported income. Finally, 
conservatism generates due to the regulatory force. Standard setters and regulators 
tend to be conservative in Financial reporting system because they likely undertake 
more risk of being blamed and being charged more cost if the firms overstate their 
net assets value and earnings. 
 
Conservatism refers to firms' "prudent reaction to uncertainty" (FASB, 1980). 
According to (IASB, 1989), the prudence of economic uncertainty requires the firms 
not to overstate firms' assets or income and not to understate firms' liability or 
expenses. The first dimension of accounting conservatism in the literature is 
unconditional conservatism (ex ante conservatism), which can be understood as the 
understatement of assets and overstatement of liabilities (e,g Watts and Zimmerman, 
1986). The second dimension of accounting conservatism is conditional conservatism 
(ex post conservatism), which is defined by Basu (1997) as the asymmetric 
recognition of economic losses versus gains, resulting in earnings reflect 'bad news' 
faster than 'good news'. Incremental coefficient on bad news in Basu (1997)'s 
earnings regression model is used to measure the degree of firms' conditional 
conservatism. Basu's definition of conditional conservatism emphasizes on the 
understatement of reported earnings and thus is also referred as earnings 
conservatism. In the empirical part of my thesis, I follow Basu's definition to test 
sample firms' earnings conservatism.  
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Given that financial reporting requires managers to make judgments over firms' 
economic events, for example managers need to make judgments over assets' 
estimated useful life, bad debt allowance, assets impairment, pension obligation. It 
thus enables managers to exert their discretions over accruals or change in 
accounting policies to influence reported earning. However, the manipulated earnings 
distort firms' true and underlying economic performance and thus mislead the 
investors who make investment decision depending on firms' released financial 
statements.  
 
Managers are motivated to engage in earnings management for three typical 
incentives. First, stock market sees accounting information such as earnings reported 
by managers as an indicator for valuing firms' stock price. It thus causes managers' 
incentives to manage reported earnings so as to affect firms' stock price in the short 
run. They may be motivated to either manipulate earnings upwards as to increase 
firms' share price and thus maximize current shareholders' interests, or may influence 
buyout firms' stock price to go down by understating earnings deliberately in favor of 
their own benefits. Second, bonus and debt contracts generate earnings management 
practice. In order to maximize their bonuses, manager are encouraged to manipulate 
earings upwards when reported earnings fall between the bogey and cap of their 
bonus contracts, however, to manipulate earnings downwards either when the 
earnings fall below the bogey or surpass the cap of their bonus contracts (Healy, 
1985). Certain covenants in the debt contracts, such as a constraint on firms' levels of 
debt to equity ratio, dividend payout and interest coverage ratio etc., may also induce 
managers to take actions to report upwards-managed earnings as to avoid violating 
these constraints. Third, managers may manipulate earnings downwards as to 
mitigate political cost. For example, firms which show high profitability are more 
likely attract government and media' attention and thus may be imposed special taxes 
or more strict regulations. In this case, managers may have incentives to report lower 
earnings. 
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Managers practice earnings management normally through accruals, change in 
accounting policy and manipulation of firms' real activities. Among these techniques, 
accruals is the most desirable and frequently used one by managers than the other 
two because it is more flexible to exert by managers and is hard to detect by 
investors or other outside financial information users. As Healy (1985) states, 
accounting policy changes as an opportunistic earnings management technique is not 
as preferable to managers as accruals. While manipulation of real activities is seen as 
the least desirable technique for earning management practices (Fields et al., 2001). 
However, due to the "iron law" of accrual reversal, current accruals will reverse 
ultimately in the future accounting period. Earnings management through accruals 
therefore can only influence firms' short-term reporting accounting numbers. 
 
Based on the discussions of conservatism and earnings management above, I argue 
that in the practice of income-decreasing earning management, managers are more 
likely accelerate the recognition of bad news in earnings than good news. This action 
actually abuses the accounting conservatism principle and the tendency to report 
lower earnings actually create "an additional undesirable conservatism". Put another 
way, the income-decreasing earnings management practice actually influences firms' 
earnings conservatism by biasing the degree of firms' earnings conservatism upwards. 
In contrast, in the practice of income-increasing earnings management, managers 
may be motivated to speed up the recognition of good news in earnings while defer 
the recognition of bad news in earnings or even do not report it. This action actually 
impairs the accounting conservatism principle and the tendency to report higher 
earnings actually affects firms' earnings conservatism by biasing the degree of firms' 
earnings conservatism downwards. I also infer that the firms which engage in 
income-decreasing earnings management tend to be more conservative than the firms 
which engage in income-increasing earnings management. 
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1.2 Prior Related Research 
Basu (1997) interprets conditional conservatism as the asymmetric recognition of 
earnings in losses relative to gains. Based on this interpretation, he predicts that 
earning is more timely reflecting publicly available bad news than good news. Using 
negative stock return to proxy for bad news and positive stock return to proxy for 
good news, he regresses earnings on stock returns to examine sample firms' earnings 
conservatism. The empirical result shows that the incremental coefficient on bad 
news ( 1 ) is significantly positive, which imply that the response of earnings to 
return is stronger for bad news than for good news. Conditional conservatism also 
reflects in the persistence of earning. It is adopted to timely report transitory dip in 
the current period while deter to report unrealized gains but spread it over in the 
future periods. Basu (1997) states that the negative earnings change are more likely 
to reverse in the subsequent period than positive earnings changes and positive 
earnings changes have the tendency to persist in the future accounting periods. 
Following the study of Basu (1997), many researches work on earnings 
conservatisms. Ball, et al.(2000) extends Basu's study on earning timeliness 
asymmetry to international contexts across different GAAP regimes. They provide 
empirical evidence that the recognition in bad news is more pronounced in 
common-law based countries(e,g US) than in code-law based countries (e,g 
Germany). Pope and Walker (1999) analyze the variation in the earnings recognition 
between US and UK GAAP regimes and show evidence that the degree of earnings 
conservatism before extraordinary items under US GAAP is higher than that under 
UK GAAP, however, the result is vice versus after excluding the extraordinary items 
in the earnings.  
 
Watts (2003) summarizes four explanations for conservatism's origin. First, debt 
contracting is regarded as an important explanation for the origin of conservatism. 
(e,g Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Watts, 2003). Since managers may act contrary to 
the interest of lenders, rational lenders would incorporate certain protective 
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covenants in the debt contracts as to reduce the default risk. Beaver and Ryan (2000) 
provides empirical evidence that the more severe bondholder-shareholder conflict the 
firm faces, the more conservative it is. Chen et al. (2007) reports that conservatism 
benefits both lenders and borrowers because conservatism, on the one hand, cause 
more timely signals to firms' default risk for lenders, on the other hand, lower the 
borrowing rates for borrowers. Conservatism also helps reducing the dividend policy 
conflicts between shareholders and bondholders (Ahmed et al., 2001). Second, 
Litigation explanation for conservatism can be derived from the evidence of the 
variations in conservatism across different litigation regimes. Basu (1997) examines 
the conservatism in the US in four periods and find that the increase of conservatism 
is consistent with the increase of auditors' litigation exposure over the four periods. 
Ball et al. (2000) investigates the variation of conservatism across different GAAP 
regimes in the international context. They find that financial reporting in 
common-law based countries such as U.S, UK are more conservative than in 
code-law based countries such as France, Germany. Third, the connection between 
financial reporting and tax reporting results in conservatism in accounting (Watts, 
2003). Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) provide evidence that tax planning affects the 
choice of accounting methods. The conformity between firms' accounting and 
taxable income can be regarded as a sign for identifying the degree of conservatism. 
Kim and Jung (2007) and Heltzer (2009) report that the relation between tax and 
conservatism is stronger when firms' reported income is more conform to its taxable 
income. Finally, regulatory considerations can be another explanation for 
conservatism origin. Regulators and standard-setters (e,g FASB; SEC) tend to set 
conservatism accounting and reporting standards. SEC (Securities and Exchange 
Commission) establishes a set of regulations to forbid firms' managers overstating 
net assets value over its first 30 years (Walker, 1992). Lobo and Zhou (2006) show 
empirical evidence that the financial reporting conservatism increases after SOX Act 
and the resultant SEC certification requirement are published.   
 
Empirical researches mainly adopt three measures to assess the conservatism. First, 
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earning-stock returns relation can be used as a measure for conservatism. after the 
study of Basu (1997), literatures on conditional conservatism usually use the 
incremental coefficient on bad news( 1 ) in Basu (1997) regression model to measure 
the degree of firms' conditional conservatism (e,g Ball et al., 2000; Pope and Walker, 
1999; Holthausen and Watts, 2001). Second, the sign and magnitude of accruals over 
time can measure conservatism and negative periodic net accruals over time, as 
stated by Givoly and Hayn, 2000, is an indication for the degree of conservatism. 
Third, net asset can be used as a measure for conservatism. Firms' book to market 
ratio is applied by Beaver and Ryan (2000) to measure conservatism based on the 
notion that, under conservatism, firms tend to report lower net assets and thus lower 
book to market ratio. Feltham and Ohlson (1995,1996) develop valuation models 
which can be applied to measure the degree of understatement of net assets. 
 
Managers are induced to engage in earnings management practice for various 
incentives. First, managers manipulate reported earnings as to affect firms' stock 
price in the short run. For one thing, they may manipulate earnings upwards to 
overstate reported earnings. Teoh, et al. (1998) find that managers intend to manage 
earnings upwards to increase firms' IPO price and that there is a reversal of 
unexpected accruals in the post IPO period. In the case of the acquisition financed by 
stock, the positive unexpected accruals and the subsequent accrual reversal can also 
be detected. (Erickson and Wang, 1999). For another, managers may manipulate 
earnings downwards to understate reported earnings. Perry and William (1994) report 
that there exists negative discretionary accruals before a management buyout, which 
indicates that managers have the incentives to decrease earnings. Abarbanell and 
Lehavy (2003) find evidence that firms have the tendency to show negative 
discretionary accruals when receiving sell recommendation. Second, managers' 
incentives to manage earnings upwards or downwards are subject to their bonus 
contracts. As a seminal study of contracting incentives for earnings management, 
Healy (1985) reports that managers manipulate earnings upwards only when earnings 
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fall between the bogey and cap of their bonus contracts. However, they are motivated 
to manipulate earnings downwards either when the earnings fall below the bogey or 
surpass the cap of their bonus contracts. Dechow and Sloan (1991) investigate 
whether firms' R&D expense decreases when top managers' (e,g CEOs') tenure is 
closing, they find that firms' CEOs cut R&D expense in their final year of 
incumbency as to report higher earnings. Finally, political considerations can explain 
for the income-decreasing earnings management. Jones (1991) reports that firms 
show greater negative accruals in the period of import relief investigation than the 
period without this investigation, in line with it, Cahan (1992) find that firms under 
anti-trust investigation by US government show more earnings-decreasing abnormal 
accruals during the investigation years. Key (1997) provides empirical results that 
the negative unexpected accruals are detected in the firms of the cable television 
industry when they are in face of government deregulation hearings. 
 
Managers most frequently use accruals as a technique to practice earnings 
management. Total accruals can be decomposed into non-discretional component and 
discretionary component by prior literatures. (e,g Healy, 1985; DeAngelo, 1986; 
Jones, 1991; Subramanyam, 1996; Xie, 2001). As argued by Scott (2003), 
discretional accruals component is especially utilized for earnings management 
purpose. Discretionary accruals and earnings management are used synonymously in 
the literature (Kothari, 2001). Prior earnings management literatures use 
discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management (e,g Lara, et al., 2005; 
Pae, 2007). Beginning with Healy (1985), a variety of methodologies for measuring 
accruals are developed by researchers. Dechow et al. (1995) review and analyze 
primary accrual methodologies up to date, including Healy (1985) model, DeAngelo 
(1986) model, Jones (1991) model, Industry Model and also provide their modified 
Jones (1991) model. Among these accrual models, Jones (1991) models are widely 
accepted by researchers and considered as the best existing accruals estimation 
methodology. Jones (1991) accruals model is a time-series estimation model. Similar 
to Healy and DeAngelo models, Jones model is a time-series estimation model, 
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however, it releases the assumption that non-discretionary accruals is constant over 
the estimation period and thus it estimates the non-discretionary accruals more 
accurately than the previous models. In Jones model, total accruals is regressed on 
the variables of firms' fixed assets and changes in firms' sales to get estimated 
parameters to estimate non-discretionary accruals. And then the discretionary 
accruals component is assume to be the residuals after deducting the 
non-discretionary accruals component from the total accruals. 
 
Some earnings management literatures are interested in exploring the relation 
between earning management and conditional conservatisms and empirically 
examining whether earning management influence the conditional conservatism. 
Lara et al. (2005) investigate the variations of earnings management's effect on the 
measure of earnings conservatism across the different institutional contexts (common 
law context and code law context). The empirical result shows that discretionary 
accruals in code-law based countries (Germany and France) has a significant 
association with bad news, biasing upwards the incremental bad news coefficient 
( 1 ) , which is a measure of earnings conservatism in Basu (1997) regression model. 
The result implies that earnings management, which can be measured by 
discretionary accruals, actually affects the degree of firms' earnings conservatism in 
the code-law based countries. 
 
Accruals can be used by managers to implement conservative accounting principle . 
However, relatively little prior earning management literatures place emphasis on the 
effect accruals have on conditional conservatism. Pae (2007) examines whether 
managers' discretion over accruals influence conditional conservatism. He 
decomposes total accruals into non-discretionary component and discretionary 
component and tests the impact both accruals components may have on conditional 
conservatism. Empirical evidence shows that it is the discretionary component, rather 
than non-discretionary component, that mainly contribute to conditional 
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conservatism. 
  
Prior literatures reviewed above are all mainstream researches in the fields of 
conditional conservatism and earnings management. Mainly grounded on these 
studies, my thesis is intended to further explore the relation between the earnings 
management and conditional conservatism (earnings conservatism). 
 
1.3 Research Problem and Structure of Thesis 
 
This thesis attempts to explore the relation between the earnings management and 
conditional conservatism and empirically examine the impact earnings management 
has on the conditional conservatism. It is conducted as an empirical, quantitative 
research and can be classified as an association study. 
 
In the empirical part of this study, I use negative discretionary accruals to proxy for 
income-decreasing earnings management and positive discretionary accruals to 
proxy for income-increasing earnings management. Jones (1991) accruals model is 
applied to estimate sample firms' discretionary accruals. The incremental coefficient 
on bad news ( 1 ) in Basu (1997) earnings regression model is used to measure the 
degree of firms' earnings conservatism.  
 
Specifically, I first apply Jones (1991) accruals model to calculate firms' estimated 
discretionary accruals and then partition the sample firms into two sub-sample 
according to the sign of firms' discretionary accruals. The firms who get negative 
discretionary accruals fall into an income-decreasing earning management 
sub-sample, the firms who get positive discretionary accruals fall into an 
income-increasing earnings management sub-sample. Next, I run Basu regression 
model for the full sample firms and the two sub-sample firms respectively. I predict 
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that in Basu (1997) regression model, the incremental coefficient on bad news ( 1 ) 
for income-decreasing sub-sample firms is higher than that of full sample firms and 
that the incremental coefficient on bad news ( 1 ) for income-increasing sub-sample 
firms is lower than that of full sample firms. Put another way, an upwards bias in 
earnings conservatism is expected to exist in income-decreasing sub-sample firms, 
while a downwards bias in earnings conservatism is expected to exist in 
income-increasing sub-sample firms.  
 
To empirically examine whether the firms which engage in income-decreasing 
earnings management tend to be more conservative than the firms which engage in 
income-increasing earnings management, I create a dummy variable,
itS , which set 
equal 1 if the sign of discretionary accruals of the sample firms is negative, and set 
equal 0 otherwise, to differentiate two sub samples. I incorporate itS  into Basu (1997) 
regression model and run the combined regression to obtain the estimated coefficient 
3 , which captures the difference of earnings' response to bad news between the 
sample firms with negative discretionary accruals and the sample firms with positive 
discretionary accruals. 
3 is predicted to be positive, which indicates that the 
income-decreasing sub-sample firms response more strongly to bad news than the 
income-increasing sub-sample firms do, in other words, income-decreasing 
sub-sample firms are more conservative than the income-increasing sub-sample 
firms.  
 
In line with my predictions, empirical results shows: (1) In Basu regression model, 
the negative discretionary accruals sub sample obtains the higher incremental 
coefficient on bad news
1 than the full sample does, while the negative discretionary 
accruals sub sample obtains the lower incremental coefficient on bad news than the 
full sample does. (2) In the combined regression model, the estimated coefficient 3 , 
 
 
19 
which captures the incremental earnings' response to bad news for the negative 
discretionary accruals sub sample firms, is significantly positive.  
 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 first introduces the 
concepts of accounting conservatisms, particularly addresses conditional 
conservatism (earnings conservatisms) based on the study of Basu (1997), then offers 
four explanations for the origin of conservatism, and finally presents three typical  
measures for conservatisms. Chapter 3 explains the concepts and incentives for 
earnings management, and then discusses techniques and main patterns for earning 
management, and finally underlines accrual-based earning management. Chapter 4 
builds the the link between earnings conservatisms and earnings management and 
develops two hypotheses of this study. Chapter 5 interprets the research design. 
Chapter 6 first describes the data and sample selection. And then provides empirical 
results and the analysis of results. Chapter 7 offers the conclusion and limitation of 
this thesis. 
 
2 ACCOUNTING CONSERVATISM 
2.1 Definition 
Financial Accounting Standards Board Statement Concept Statement NO.2 defines 
accounting conservatism as a "prudent reaction to uncertainty" ( FASB. 1980). In the 
International Accounting Standards Board(IASB) framework, the "prudence" is 
interpreted as "assets or income are not overstated and liability or expenses are not 
understated." (IASB, 1989). 
 
Accounting conservatism generally can be manifested in two different dimensions in 
the literature. First, it is referred as unconditional conservatism (Beaver and Ryan, 
2005), also labeled as balance sheet conservatism, ex ante conservatism (Richardson 
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and Tinaikar, 2004) or news-independent conservatism (Chandra et al., 2004). 
Unconditional conservatism can be understood as the understatement of assets and 
overstatement of liabilities (e,g Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Ball and Shivakumar 
(2006) refers unconditional conservatism as low earnings and book values 
independent of economic outcomes. Examples of accounting practices under 
unconditional conservatism include immediate expensing depreciation of property, 
plant, and equipment (such as adoption of accelerated depreciation accounting 
method), adopting conservative inventory valuation policies (such as LIFO inventory 
valuation in the economic of inflation) and immediate expensing all R&D cost in 
current earnings.  
 
Second, the accounting conservatism is referred as conditional conservatism (e,g 
Basu, 1997; Ball et al., 2000), also labeled as income statement conservatism , ex 
post conservatism (Richardson and Tinaikar, 2004) or news-dependent conservatism 
(Chandra et al., 2004). Conditional conservatism is traditionally described as " 
anticipate no profit but anticipate all losses" ( e,g Bliss, 1924). Consistent with this 
interpretation, Basu, (1997) defines conservatism as "the accountant's tendency to 
require a higher degree of verification to recognize good news as gains than to 
recognize bad news as losses". In other words, the conservatism is the asymmetry of 
timeliness in recognition of losses relative to gains in Basu's definition. In the similar 
way to Basu's definition, Watts (2003) defines conditional conservatism as the 
differential verifiability required for recognition of profits versus losses. Examples of 
conditional accounting conservatism include the adoption of the accounting rule of 
recording assets impairment but not revaluing them upwards, accruing bad debt 
allowance, writing down account receivable and the asymmetric treatment of 
contingent losses relative to contingent gains etc. 
 
The adoption of both conditional and unconditional accounting conservatisms 
achieves several important objectives. First, it protects the interest of investors, claim 
holders and other stakeholders through capturing the firms' perceived future loss in 
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the current accounting period. Second, it mitigates firms' litigation and regulatory 
costs by reducing firms' litigation risk. Third, it reduces firms' present value of tax 
liabilities when taxable income is tied to reported income. In addition, it enables 
accounting and industry regulators to set standards based on it to avoid economic 
instability. 
 
The literature places different emphasis on unconditional conservatism and 
conditional conservatism. Beaver and Ryan (2005) discusses that the unconditional 
conservatism gives more focus on valuating on types of economic assets and 
liabilities and investigating the valuations' effects on future income. Unconditional 
conservatism results in that book value of equity is expected to be lower than the 
market value of equity, especially when firms' future cash flow is uncertain. On the 
other hand, the conditional conservatism endeavors in protecting the shareholders 
and other stakeholders' interests and thus improving the contracting efficiency, 
considering that there exist conflicts between the managers and shareholders and  
managers have incentives to report upward-biased accounting numbers. Basu (2005) 
points out the critical difference between conditional and unconditional conservatism 
is that conditional conservatism uses information when it is received in future 
periods, while unconditional conservatism only uses information which is known at 
the start of the asset's life.  
 
Several accounting researches put eyes on the relation between the two dimensions 
of conservatisms, Pope and Walker (2003) and Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) 
provide empirical evidence that the firm's level of unconditional conservatism, 
proxied by the market-to-book ratio, has a negative association with the degree of 
conditional conservatism, proxied by asymmetric timeliness in earnings. Further, 
Beaver and Ryan (2005) develop a model to capture the distinct natures of and 
interactions between conditional and unconditional conservatism. The application of 
the model reveals the fact that unconditional conservatism is determined at the 
beginning life of assets and liabilities and thus precedes conditional conservatism and 
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that conditional conservatism affects subsequent unconditional conservatism when it 
resets the cost bases of net assets. By providing empirical evidence, Gassen et al. 
(2006) also shows a negative relation between conditional and unconditional 
conditional conservatism in his study.  
 
2.2 Conditional Conservatism 
 
" Conservatism in the balance sheet is of dubious value if attained at the expense of 
conservatism in the income statement, which is far more significant." (CAP,1939). 
This statement in financial accounting underlines the importance of placing our 
emphasis on income statement with regard to accounting conservatism. That is 
conditional conservatism. 
 
Basu (1997) interprets conditional conservatism as the asymmetric timeliness in 
recognition of economic losses versus economic gains, which results in that earning 
more timely reflect publicly available "bad news" than "good news". Basu uses 
negative stock return to proxy for "bad news" and positive stock return to proxy for 
"good news".  
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Figure 1. Example of book value of a fixed asset under conservative accounting when estimates 
of remaining useful life change (Basu, 1997) 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Example of reported net income under conservative accounting when estimates of 
remaining useful life of a fixed asset change (Basu, 1997) 
 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 display the example Basu (1997) gives to illustrate the effect 
conditional conservatism has on balance sheet and income statement. Figure 1 
illustrates the effect the news has on the book value of firms' fixed asset. Assume that 
the original purchased value of a fixed asset is $70,000 with an estimated useful life 
of ten years and straight-line depreciation method is applied to this fixed asset.  
Figure 2 illustrates the effect the news has on the net income of firm. The firm is 
assumed to have $41,000 net income before the depreciation charge each year of the 
fixed assets' life.  
 
Consider a firm receiving news that changes its estimate of the productive life of a 
fixed asset (Basu, 1997). If a firm receives a bad news at the end of fourth year of 
asset's life which results in the asset useful life is expected to reduce by, say three 
years, then an asset impairment would be recorded immediately in the concurrent 
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earnings under conservative accounting principle. It therefore leads to the sharp fall 
down of the concurrent earnings, however, the it would not affect the firm's reported 
earnings in the subsequent accounting periods. While, If good news is received and 
the asset useful life is expected to increase by three years, the firm would reduce the 
depreciation charge in earnings gradually over the new longer estimated asset's 
useful life and the cumulative gain due to the less depreciation charge would persist 
over the future accounting periods, rather be recorded in the concurrent accounting 
period. This example reveals that, under conservative accounting, earnings response 
more strongly to bad news than to good news and the bad news effect on earnings 
has more power to reverse in the future period while good news effect on earnings is 
more persistent. 
 
Figure 3 displays the relation between the earnings and stock returns. The slope 
coefficient for negative returns is higher than for positive returns, which exactly 
illustrates Basu's interpretation of conservatisms.  
 
                        X it  
 
 
                                         Rit  
                        (0,0) 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Asymmetry in earnings recognition under conditional conservatism ( Basu, 1997) 
 
Basu (1997) examines firms' accounting conservatisms in the regression model 
below and shows that the response of earnings to negative returns is stronger than to 
positive returns.   
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itititititit RDRRDRPX  10101/                            (1) 
 
Where i and t denote the firm and year respectively. X  is the annual earnings, P  
is the stock price at the end of the previous fiscal year, R  is the contemporaneous 
annual returns. DR  is a dummy variable, which set equals 1 if R  is negative and 
set equals 0 otherwise. Coefficient
1 captures the incremental bad news effect on 
earnings and thus shows the degree of firms' conservatisms. Positive
1 indicates that 
earnings is more sensitive in bad news than good news, which thus implies a 
conservative accounting.  
 
Giving insights into the effect accruals have on accounting conservatism, Basu (1997) 
also analyzes and examines the conservatism which reflects in the differential 
timeliness of earnings over cash flow in bad news period versus in good news period. 
Earnings is composed of cash flow component and accruals components. Since 
accruals enable accountant to recognize unrealized losses immediately in the current 
earning whereas not recognize unrealized gains in current earnings under 
conservative accounting. The asymmetry in timeliness of earning over cash flow is 
therefore stronger for bad news than for good news, put another words, earning is 
more conservative than cash flow. 
 
Additionally, earnings conservatisms, which are applied to quickly report transitory 
dip in the current period while deter to report unrealized gains in current period but 
spread it over in the future periods, also reflects in the persistence of earning. It 
implies that the negative earnings change more likely to reverse in the following 
period than positive earnings changes and positive earnings changes has the tendency 
to persist in the future accounting periods. 
 
Following the study of Basu (1997), many accounting researchers work on  
earnings conservatisms. Regarding the study of earning conservatism in the 
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international context, Ball et al.(2000) extends Basu's study on earning timeliness 
asymmetry to international contexts with different GAAP regimes. They find 
empirical evidence that the recognition in bad news is more pronounced in 
common-law based countries(e,g US) than in code-law based countries (e,g Germany) 
and the recognition in bad news in UK firms is as half sensitive as in US firms. They 
attribute these earning timeliness asymmetry variations across the countries to the 
legal and institutional reasons. Pope and Walker (1999) analyze the variation in the 
earnings recognition between US and UK GAAP regimes and provide evidence that 
the degree of earnings conservatism before extraordinary items under US GAAP is 
higher than that under UK GAAP, however, the result is vice versus after excluding 
the extraordinary items in the earnings. 
 
In my thesis, consistent with the definition of conditional conservatism in Basu 
(1997), I interpret conservatism as the asymmetric earnings timeliness in the 
recognition of bad news relative to good news. And I use the incremental coefficient 
for bad news (
1 ) in Basu (1997) regression model to measure the degree of 
conditional conservatisms. 
 
2.3 Explanations for Conservatism Origin 
 
Watts (2003) summarizes four explanations for conservatism. First, conservatism 
mitigate the moral hazard and adverse selection problem between contracting parties. 
Second, conservatism reduces the expected cost of litigation because overstatement 
of net assets and earning increase litigation risk and thus more likely result in higher 
litigation cost than understatement of net assets and earnings. Third, conservatism 
reduces the present value of tax liabilities when taxable income is influenced by 
reported income. Finally, conservatism benefit regulator setters such as the SEC and 
the FASB by reducing political costs due to the overstatement of net assets and 
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earnings. 
 
2.3.1 Contracting Explanation 
Firms can be regarded as a joint of various contracts, of which contracts between 
firms and managers(employment contracts), between firms and its lenders(lending 
contracts or debt contracts) are two typical and important ones. Agency theory points 
out there exists the conflict between the contracting parties.  
 
Information asymmetry is defined as that some parties to business transactions may 
have an information advantage over others (Scott, 2003, 7). In financial accounting, 
there are two typical types of information asymmetry which are adverse selection 
and moral hazard. Adverse selection arises when managers exploit their information 
advantage of the firms at the the expense of outside stakeholders, such as lenders and 
investors. Moral hazard arises when the separation of ownership and control of the 
firms results in the difficulty for shareholders and creditors to observe the managers' 
effort or performance. Since managers often have the private knowledge of the firm's 
operations and due to the existence of information asymmetry, once their 
compensations are linked to the their performances,which usually measured by 
reported earnings, they have incentives and possibilities to bias the accounting 
number to avoid any adverse effect that will reduce their compensation. Under this 
circumstance, conservatism is endowed an ex ante efficient role between contracting 
parties.  
 
Regarding the employment contracts, due to the existence of information asymmetry, 
managers often have the private knowledge of the firm's operations and thus can 
exploit their information advantage of the firms over the outsiders. Once their 
compensations are linked to the their performances, which usually measured by 
reported earnings, they have incentives and possibilities to bias the accounting 
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number to avoid any adverse effect that will reduce their compensation. In this case, 
conservatism is required by owners (investors) to avoid managers' incentive to bias 
earnings upwards and mislead their investment decisions.  
 
With regard to the debt contract, as early as Gilman (1939), he explains that 
accounting conservatism originates partly from the demand in debt markets. Positive 
accounting theory also suggests that conservatism plays an important role in 
contracting efficiency and regards debt contracting as one important explanation for 
the origin of conservatism. (e,g Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Watts, 2003). Moral 
hazard problem arises between debtholders and firm's managers just as it does 
between the owners and managers. Since managers may act contrary to the interest 
of lenders. Due to their information disadvantage, rational lenders will incorporate 
certain protective covenants in the debt contracts in order to bind the firm' financial 
condition to a constant threshold. For example, they may set a limitation for the 
firms' dividend payout or require firm not to exceed a certain debt to equity ratio etc. 
Conservatism requires managers to report losses in earnings more quickly than gains. 
It thus facilitate the lenders to identify more timely the potential increase in default 
risk, which may be caused by either external business shocks or firms' opportunistic 
behaviors.  
 
Conservatism can benefit both lenders and borrowers in a debt contract. Lenders and 
other creditors demand more timely information about 'bad news' because the option 
value of their claims is more sensitive to a decline than an increase in firm value 
(Smith, 1979). Once covenants are violated by firms, lenders can benefit from it 
through, for example, increasing borrowing rate. On the other hand, from the 
borrowers' perspective, they have the incentives to commit not to violate lenders' 
interest and thereby reduce cost of debt or avoid paying higher cost rate. Chen et al. 
(2007) first directly empirically examine the benefit the conservatism brings to both 
lenders and borrowers in a debt contract. He find that conservatism benefit both 
lenders and borrowers because conservatism contributes to more timely signals of 
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firms' default risk for lenders and the lower borrowing rates for borrowers.  
 
Several academic research papers explore the relation between the conservatism and 
debt contracting. Beaver and Ryan (2000) provides empirical evidence to support 
that the more severe bondholder-shareholder conflict the firm faces, the more 
conservative it is. They document that conservatism increase the borrowers' interest 
by decreasing the cost of debt and that more conservative the borrowers is, the lower 
borrowing rates they receive. Ball et al. (2005) documents that conditional 
conservatism, which is defined as asymmetric timeliness in recognition of losses, can 
improve debt contracting efficiency. He attributes it to the reason that conservatism 
accelerates debt covenant violations so that the decision rights are transferred to 
lenders more quickly. Ahmed et al. (2001) states that conservatisms play a role in 
reducing the dividend policy conflicts between shareholders and bondholders. 
  
2.3.2 Litigation Explanation 
Due to the existence of information asymmetry and interest conflicts, as discussed in 
last subsection, shareholders are likely mislead by the accounting numbers reported 
by managers. Shareholders litigation arises when fraud or misstatement is found in 
reported financial statements and firm's managers, directors or auditor is sued by 
shareholders. As the increasing shareholders' lawsuit in 1960s, shareholders litigation 
has been seen as another important explanation for the conservatism. "Overstating 
net assets is more likely to generate litigation costs than understating net assets. 
Conservatism, by understating net assets, reduces the firm's expected litigation 
costs." (Watts, 1993).  
 
Since the understatement of net asset by applying conservatism in accounting can 
decline the firms' litigation risk and thus mitigate firms' litigation costs, firms' 
managers and auditors therefore have the incentives to report lower earnings and 
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value of net asset. 
 
Litigation explanation for conservatism can derive from the evidence of the 
variations in conservatism across different litigation regimes. Watts (1993) predicts 
that accounting conservatism in US firms increases with the increasing litigation risk 
in US legal environment. Basu (1997) tests the conservatism in the US in four 
periods and find that the increase of conservatism is consistent with the increase of 
auditors' litigation exposure over the four periods. This significant positive 
relationship between auditors' legal liability exposure and accounting conservatism 
suggests that more litigation risk generates more conservatism. Ball et al. (2000) 
investigates the variation of conservatism across different GAAP regimes in the 
international context. They find that financial reporting in common-law based 
countries, such as United State, Australia and Canada and United Kingdom, are 
significantly more conservative than in code-law based countries such as France, 
Germany and Japan. While among the common-law based sample countries, United 
Kingdom shows the least accounting conservatism. These significant variations in 
conservatism across litigate regimes are in line with the legal and regulation 
explanations for conservatism. 
 
2.3.3 Tax Explanation 
 
Income tax as a nexus links financial reporting system to tax system since its 
calculation is tied to firm's reported earnings. This link between tax system and 
financial reporting system provides incentives for managers to employ conservative 
accounting methods in financial reporting to report lower income in the high tax-rate 
accounting period and shift the earnings to low tax-rate accounting period as to 
reduce the tax payment. So to speak, as tax rates increase, the reported earning 
becomes more conservative. Watts(2003) suggests that the connection between 
financial and tax reporting results in conservatism in accounting since the more 
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timely earnings recognition of losses than gains enable managers to delay reporting 
unrealized revenue but recognize anticipated losses timely as to reduce present value 
of tax payment.  
 
Through applying conservatism accounting principle, manager can make appropriate 
tax planning as to reduce tax cost. Tax system influences the choice of accounting 
methods can trace back to 1909 in US. Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) provide 
evidence that tax planning affects the choice of accounting methods. Watts (2003) 
also mentions some examples of financial accounting method which are affected by 
tax system. For example, firms may apply LIFO accounting method to inventory 
valuation so as to record more product cost in current income statement. 
 
The conformity between firms' accounting and taxable income can be seen as a sign 
for identifying the degree of conservatism. Watts (2003) argues that the stronger the 
association between financial and tax reporting is, the more conservative the firm is. 
Consistent with it, Kim and Jung (2007) and Heltzer (2009) report the empirical 
results that the relation between tax and conservatism is stronger when firms' 
reported income is more conform to its taxable income.  
  
In addition, the adoption of different measures for conservatism influences the 
empirical result of study on the relation between conservatism and firms' tax 
payment. Kim and Jung (2007) find a positive relation between conservatism and 
taxes using unconditional conservatism measure, while no such relation is found 
using conditional conservatism measures.The result indicates that the choice of 
conservatism measure affects the the study on tax-induce conservatism.  
 
2.3.4 Regulation Explanation 
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Regulatory force contributes to the conservatism. Standard setters and regulators are 
prone to conservatism in Financial reporting system because they likely undertake 
more risk of being blamed and being charged more cost if the firms overstate their 
net assets value and earnings. Watts (1977) argues that losses resulted from 
overstated assets and incomes are more likely detected in the political process than 
gains. This induces regulators and standard-setters to tend to be conservative. 
Through setting conservatism accounting and reporting standards, standard setters 
and regulators (e,g FASB; SEC) can reduce the risk and the regulation cost imposed 
on them. 
 
The government regulation of financial reporting can be traced back to the 
establishment of the Securities Acts in 1930s. Securities Acts originates from the 
lesson of the collapse of NYSE stock in 1929 and thus adhere its rationale to 
conservatism as to be against the overvaluation of firms' stock. SEC (Securities and 
Exchange Commission) formulates a set of regulations to forbid firms' managers 
overstating net assets value (Walker, 1992) over its first 30 years. They both exert 
regulatory effect on conservatism.  
 
Lobo and Zhou (2006) investigate the changes in managerial discretion on 
conservatism after Sarbanes-Oxley Act and find that lower discretionary accruals are 
reported in the post-period and that losses are recognized more timely than gains in 
the post-SOX period. These findings both suggest that the financial reporting 
conservatism increases after SOX Act and the resultant SEC certification 
requirement are published. Thus, SOX can be seen as another potential source for the 
regulatory explanation for the conservatism. 
 
2.4 Conservatism Measures 
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Watts (2003) points out three typical measures which are applied by empirical 
research to assess the conservatism. These measures are used to examine the 
time-series and cross-sectional variations in conservatism and thus help researchers 
generate discriminations for these variations among alternative conservatism 
explanations: contracting, litigation, taxation and accounting regulation which are 
discussed in the last subsection. 
 
First, earnings and accruals are used as measures for conservatism. Earnings is the 
sum of operating cash flows component and accruals component. The difference 
between earnings and operating cash flows is therefore due to the accrual adjustment. 
Therefore, earnings conservatism can be reflected on the sign and magnitude of 
accruals. In other words, the sign and magnitude of accruals over time can measure 
conservatism and negative periodic net accruals over time are normally used as 
measures for conservatism. " Consistent predominance of negative accruals across 
firms over a long period is, ceteris paribus, an indication of conservatism, while the 
rate of accumulation of negative accruals is an indication of the shift in the degree of 
conservatism over time" (Givoly and Hayn, 2000). 
 
As discussed in previous subsection, Basu (1997) regresses earning changes on 
annual return and provides empirical result supporting his prediction that negative 
earnings changes have more tendency to reverse in the future period than positive 
earnings changes. It implies that gains tend to be more persistent than losses under 
conservatism principle. The persistence of earnings can also be used as measures for 
conservatism. The more persistent earning is, the more conservatism it is. While this 
asymmetric treatment of gains relative to losses is achieved through accruals which 
is applied by accountant to spread the unrealized gains over the future periods while 
to accrue fully anticipated losses immediately in current period. This conservatism 
results in the consequence that accruals are tend to be negative and accumulated 
accruals are tend to be underestimated. 
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Second, earning-stock returns relation can be used as a measure for conservatism. 
Basu (1997), Ball et al. (2000) and Holthausen and Watts (2001) regresses abnormal 
return, which captures the stock market's response to earning news, on earnings 
changes, which proxy for earning news. They provide consistent empirical result that 
in the regression model, the higher slope coefficient
1 and adjusted
2R are detected in 
the sample surprised by positive earnings changes than in the sample surprised by 
negative earnings changes. It implies that stock market return responses to positive 
earnings changes more sensitively than negative earnings changes because it 
considers the positive changes are more persistent than the negative earnings changs 
and thus will capitalize more value on one dollar change of the former than of the 
latter. 
 
Third, net asset can be used as a measure for conservatism, which is mainly applied 
by the researchers focusing on unconditional conservatism (balance sheet 
conservatism). Under unconditional conservatism, negative changes in asset value 
are recognized while positive change in asset value is not. It thus results in the 
understatement of net asset value compared to its market value. Prior literatures 
employ book to market ratio measure and valuation model measure for unconditional 
conservatism. Beaver and Ryan (2000) use firms' book to market ratios to measure 
conservatism based on the notion that, under conservatism, firms report lower net 
assets and thus lower book to market ratios. Feltham and Ohlson (1995,1996) 
develop valuation models which are usually applied to assess the extent of 
understatement of net assets. 
 
3 EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
3.1 Definition 
From the standard setters point of view, earning management can be defined as 
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follows:  
 
" Earning management occurs when managers use judgment in financial 
 reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either 
 mislead some stake holders about the underlying economic performance of the 
 company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
 accounting number" (Healy and Wahlen, 1998). 
 
This definition displays two perspectives from which we can view earning 
management. On the one hand, from a financial reporting perspective, managers may 
manipulate earnings and report the distorted accounting figures to the public 
information users, such as investors, creditors etc. One important role financial 
accounting plays is to facilitate managers to convert the firm's inside information to 
the outsider users. However. the manipulated earnings distort firms' true and 
underlying economic performance and thus mislead the investors who make 
investment decision depending on firms' released financial statements. On the other 
hand, from a contracting perspective, to benefit managers themselves at the expense 
of other contracting parties, managers may opportunistically use earning 
management as a vehicle to show better accounting number, to which their 
compensations tied. 
 
Additionally, the definition also puts forward the way managers can exert the 
earnings management. That is through "judgment in financial reporting", which is 
reflected in managers' choice of different accounting policies. For example, 
managers may accrue less bad debt provision, choose FIFO accounting method for 
inventory valuation in deflation period, or choose straight-line rather than 
accelerating assets depreciation accounting method for recording less depreciation in 
income statement as to report higher profit. As stated by Scotts (2003,369), "Earning 
management is the choice by manager of accounting policies so as to achieve some 
specific objectives" 
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It is necessary to make a distinction between earning management and financial 
fraud. Even there is no a clear and fixed definition for earning management in 
academic or regulation field, as an extreme circumstance of earning management, 
financial fraud is well defined as follows: 
 
" The intentional, deliberate misstatement or omission of material facts, or 
 accounting data, which is misleading and when considered with all the 
 information made available, would cause the reader to change or alter his or her 
 judgment or decision" (National Association of Fraud Certified examiner, 1993, 
 12)   
 
Dechow and Skinner (2000) point out that according to SEC's discussion of earning 
management and fraud, if financial reporting choices violate GAAP, then it 
constitutes both of them, while if financial reporting choices are made within the 
bound of GAAP, then it only constitutes earnings management rather fraud. It means 
earnings management is allowed and legal as long as the financial choices do not 
violate GAAP. However, this distinction between earnings management and financial 
fraud raises a question of what if the former will cause adverse consequence of the 
firms as the financial fraud would do even the accounting choices or judgments made 
by managers fall within GAAP.  
 
Another question people may wonder, is that earnings management on earth good or 
bad? Should it exist? Since the reliability of the financial statement information is 
reduced to some extent due to the existence of earning management, people may 
argue that why it still exists? From the cost-effective point of view, Schipper (1989) 
argue that the it is costly for practitioners and regulators to find out the evidence of 
earnings management, given that the "trick" earnings management play is difficult to 
detect ( e,g use discretionary accruals as a technique), or is hard to understand for 
outside information users (e,g use the changes of accounting policies as a technique). 
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Regardless of cost consideration, should earnings management persist? What is the 
good side and bad side of it? 
 
The answer to the question above rely s on how earnings management is used. For 
the good side of earnings management, it can be used as a medium to transfer the 
manager's inside information to the market to improve the relevance of financial 
accounting information so that the firms' underlying future performance can be better 
reflected and thus investors can make better prediction and investment decision 
relying on these information. On the other hand, from contracting efficiency 
perspective, it is preferable to enable managers to manage earnings to some extent, 
so as to confront with incomplete and rigid contracts. For the bad side of earnings 
management, first, to maximize their bonus, managers tend to practice earnings 
management to affect accounting reporting numbers. The released financial 
information may mislead the investors and impair their interests. Second, managers 
have the tendency to manipulate earning to influence firms' share price. For example, 
managers are encouraged to manage earnings upwards so as to raise the firm's share 
price when issuing new share. It benefits the current shareholders however impairs 
the interest of the new shareholders. More explicit discussion about the incentives for 
earnings management is given in the following section. 
 
3.2 Incentives for Earnings Management 
Three primary incentives are discussed in this section. As Healy and Wahlen (1998) 
state, the first two incentives, the capital market incentive and contracting incentives 
are related to firms' reported accounting figures and the third one, political incentive 
is relevant to political process which influences firms' operating environment. 
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3.2.1 Capital Market Incentives 
Accounting information such as net income reported by managers serves investors 
for valuing firms' stock price. Clarkson et al. (1992) provides empirical evidence that 
market responds significantly to earnings forecasts as an indicator of firms' value.   
It thus causes managers' incentives to manage reported earnings so as to affect firms' 
stock price in the short run. However, this influence will reverse in the future 
accounting period due to the iron law of accrual reversal. 
 
On the one hand, there exist the incentives for managers to manage earnings upwards 
or report overstated earnings. Prior literature provides several empirical findings 
which imply managers' incentives to overstate earnings. Dye (1988) shows that a 
manager has the motivation and ability to manipulate earnings to increase the stock 
price and thus benefit the current shareholders. In the case of IPO (initial public 
offering), given no established stock price can be referred to and information such as 
reported earnings can be helpful in signaling firms' value to investors. (Hughes, 
1986). It is possible that managers of firms going public exercise earnings 
management as to receive a better offering price. Teoh, et al.(1998) find that 
managers intend to manage earnings upwards to increase firms' IPO price and that 
there is a reversal of unexpected accruals in the post IPO period. In addition, they 
also provide evidence that managers report positive unexpected accrual, which is an 
indicator of earning increasing management, before seasoned equity offering. In the 
case of the acquisition financed by stock, the positive unexpected accruals and the 
subsequent accrual reversal can also be detected. (Erickson and Wang, 1999). In 
addition, meeting analysts' stock price expectations can be another motivation for 
managers to report overstated earnings (Burgstahler and Eames, 1998). For example, 
Firms which receive financial analysts' buy recommendation are more likely to have 
positive discretionary accruals, which indicate managers' incentives to manage 
earnings upwards through exerting discretions over accruals. (Abarbanell and Lehavy, 
2003) 
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On the other hand, managers may have incentives to manage earnings downwards or 
report understated earnings. Managers of buyout firms are motivated to understate 
earnings. Intuitively, it is understandable because managers can benefit themselves to 
influence buyout firms' stock price to go down by understating earnings. Perry and 
William (1994) examine the discretionary accruals in buyout firms and find a 
negative discretionary accruals before a management buyout, which indicates that 
managers have the incentives to decrease earnings. When receiving sell 
recommendation, firms tent to show negative discretionary accruals (Abarbanell and 
Lehavy, 2003). Additionally, Bushee (1998) provides evidence that firms are 
encouraged not to reduce reporting research and development expense in the income 
statement to avoid a decrease in the reported net income when the firms have a high 
percentage of institutional ownership. It indicates that firms with a high percentage 
of ownership by institutions do not care about reporting higher earnings by cutting 
off R&D expense. 
 
Since the managers have the incentives to manage earnings for capital market 
purpose, then does the stock market response efficiently to the earnings management? 
Subramanyam (1996) tests accruals and provides evidence that stock market 
responds positively to discretionary accruals. It is consistent with that earnings 
management can be used to reveal managers' inside information about firms' future 
earnings performance and market will responds efficiently to the discretionary 
accruals. However, this interpretation is challenged by Xie (2001). Xie (2001) 
discomposes the accruals into non-discretionary component and discretionary 
component and argues that if the market is efficient, then a lower ERC should be 
assigned to the latter than the former, given the persistence of the latter is lower than 
that of the former. However, the empirical result reveals that market overvalues the 
discretionary accruals as a result. 
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3.2.2 Contracting Incentives 
In this subsection, I will discuss two primary contractual incentives, which are bonus 
contracts incentives and debt contracts incentives for earnings management.  
 
As a seminal study of contracting incentives for earnings management, Healy (1985) 
extends the bonus plan hypothesis of positive accounting theory, and predicts that 
managers with bonus scheme are more likely to maximize current earnings by 
shifting earnings from future periods as to benefit themselves under theirs bonus 
scheme of firms. However, his study is limited to the firms whose bonus plan is tied 
to the current earnings only. After Healy's paper, numerous studies investigate the 
bonus contracts to detect managers' incentives of earnings management. As Healy 
and Wahlen (1999) states, on average, the evidences of these studies support that 
managers make accounting adjustments as to maximize their bonuses which are tied 
to reported earnings.  
 
Managers' incentives to manage earnings upwards or downwards are subject to their 
bonus plans. They will choose specific accounting policies to manipulate earnings 
upwards only when the earnings is between the bogey and cap of their bonus 
contracts. However, they are motivated to manipulate earnings downward either 
when the earnings fall below the bogey or surpass the cap of their bonus contracts 
(Healy, 1985). It is easy to interpret the reason that intuitively managers bonuses will 
increase in proportion to the increase in reported earnings and thus they are 
encouraged to maximize the reported earnings. However, when the earnings fall 
below the bogey, managers are motivated to decrease reported earnings even further, 
which is usually called " take a bath", to "reserve" earnings for the subsequent 
accounting periods and thus increase the possibility to receive the bonuses in the 
subsequent periods. For example, writing-off more bad debts in the "below bogey" 
period will reduce the bad debt provision and thus increase earnings in the following 
periods. Similarly, when the earnings surpass the cap, managers would do exactly the 
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same as when earnings fall below the bogey in order to avoid "wasting" the surplus 
of earnings and to defer the surplus to the future accounting periods.  
 
Additionally, researchers also examine the effect of implicit bonus contracts on 
managers' incentives to manage earnings. They attempt to investigate whether 
earnings management increases when top managers' (e,g CEOs') tenure is closing or 
when they face the job security problems. As reported by Dechow and Sloan (1991), 
CEOs cut the R&D expense in their final year of incumbency as to report higher 
earnings. 
 
Regarding debt contracts incentives, positive accounting theory hypothesizes that 
managers are more likely to increase current earnings via earnings management 
when firms are close to the violation of debt covenants. This hypothesis based on the 
grounds that increased reported earnings would reduce firms' default risk. Certain 
covenants are tied to when debt contracts are established, such as a constraint on 
firms' levels of debt to equity ratio, dividend payout and interest coverage ratio etc. 
To avoid violating these constraints, managers may take actions to increase current 
earnings. 
 
Many studies investigate the debt contracts incentives for earnings management (e,g 
Healy and Palepu, 1990; DeAngelo et al., 1994; Holthausen, 1981). They all examine 
the dividend constraint's effect on managers' incentives to manage earnings through 
exercising accruals or changing accounting policies. However, little evidence can be 
found to support that managers manipulate earnings as to avoid cutting their dividend 
pay out when the potential violation of dividend arises.  
  
Other than dividend constraint in the debt contracts incentive, Sweeney (1994) 
reports that covenants with regard to maintain a certain level of working capital and 
shareholders' equity are more frequently violated by firms in comparison to that of 
debt to equity ratio and interest coverage ratio. She studies a sample of firms which 
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actually violate a debt contract and finds that more earnings increasing accounting 
policies changes are made in these firms than the control sample firms in the periods 
prior to the defaulting year. However, she also report that only less than half of her 
defaulting sample firms made the accounting policies changes, which raises the  
problem of the generality in the debt contracts incentives hypothesis for earnings 
management. DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) provide evidences that sample firms 
increase earnings one year prior to the year of covenant violation. These evidences 
above lead to a mixed viewpoint with regard to the debt contracts incentives for 
earnings management. 
 
3.2.3 Political Incentives 
Political incentives for earnings management are grounded on the political cost 
hypothesis of positive accounting theory (PAT). It hypothesizes that managers are 
more likely to change accounting policies or procedure as to lower current reported 
earnings and defer it to the future period when firms are in face of political cost. 
 
Political cost may arise in the case of firms which earn high profitability and 
therefore attract more attentions from public media and government. It may cause 
politicians' action to raise new special taxation or add other more strict regulations on 
these highly profitable firms and thus offset the excess profit firms earned. 
Additionally, in the case of firms which are of large size or in the monopolistic 
industry such as oil or power industry, they are often politically exposed since their 
business activities influence large amount of people. For example, they may be 
imposed more environmental responsibilities if they show higher profitability. Finally, 
in the case of firms which are involved in anti-trust investigation, such firms may 
seek for the political process to be granted import protection or government 
subsidiary.  
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All the cases illustrated above generate managers' incentives to manipulate reported 
earnings downwards as to either reduce political cost or benefit firms from political 
process. For example, in order to avoid special taxation charge, managers of oil 
company may exercise discretions to change accounting method of inventories 
valuation to show lower profit. Several studies examine whether political 
considerations contribute to earnings management. Jones (1991) report that firms 
show greater negative accruals in the period of import relief investigation than the 
period without this investigation, which indicates managers' incentive to report lower 
earnings through exercising discretions on earnings-decreasing accruals in the face of 
import relief investigation. Consistent with it, Cahan (1992) find that firms under 
anti-trust investigation by US government show more earnings-decreasing abnormal 
accruals during the investigation years. Key (1997) reports empirical results that the 
negative unexpected accruals are detected, which implies an earnings-decreasing 
earning management, in the firms of the cable television industry when they are in 
face of government deregulation hearings. As Healy and Wahlen (1999) stated, in 
conclusion, these literatures strongly suggests that political considerations contribute 
to the incentives for earnings management. 
 
3.3 Techniques and Main Patterns for Earnings Management 
As I discussed in the last section, since various incentives induce managers to 
manipulate earnings, then the question of how managers practice earning 
managements arises. In this section, I will introduce three techniques and four main 
patterns for earnings management practices. 
 
3.3.1 Three Techniques for Earnings Management  
 
Prior literatures summarize three main ways for practicing earnings management. 
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First, exercising discretion over accruals, which is more frequently adopted way than 
the other two, can be seen as a device for earnings management. Accruals may arise 
when accounting judgments over firms' economic events by managers are required, 
for example managers need to make judgments over assets' estimated useful life, bad 
debt allowance, assets impairment, pension obligation etc. (Healy, 1985). 
 
Accruals are decomposed into non-discretional accruals (expected or normal accruals) 
or discretionary accrual (unexpected or abnormal accruals) by the prior literatures. 
Basically, non-discretionary accruals record the firms' real business activities and 
thus are reasonable and appropriate, while discretionary accruals are attributable to 
managers' discretions. As argued by Scott (2003), discretional accruals component is 
especially utilized for earnings management purpose since it is more flexible to 
exercise by managers and hard to detect by investors and other outside financial 
information users.The disadvantage of using accruals as a vehicle for earnings 
management is blame for the "iron law" of accrual reversal. Since the current 
accruals will reverse ultimately in the future accounting period, accruals are more 
used to influence firms' short-term reporting accounting numbers. More detailed 
discussions about accruals and accruals methodologies to detect earnings 
management will be given in section 3.4. 
 
Accounting policies changes, on the other hand, can serve as a vehicle for long-run 
earning management purpose. It can be used to generate an effect on firms' reporting 
accounting numbers over a long accounting period. First, accounting policies change 
may arise when the firm decides to change the way it records its ordinary business. 
The change of firms' Revenue recognition polices is an example for accounting 
policies change. Second, accounting policies change may arise when choices among 
various accounting methods have to be made by managers. For instance, managers 
need to choose an accounting method for assets' depreciation calculation between the 
straight-line and accelerated depreciation method, or to choose among FIFO or LIFO 
or average weighted accounting methods for the inventory valuation.   
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Given that firms have some flexibilities to choose a certain accounting method 
within certain accounting standards (e,g GAAP) and also can voluntarily switch it to 
another one , it creates the possibility for managers to take advantage of it to manage 
earnings for their own purposes. For bonus purpose, to increase their future bonuses, 
managers might be encouraged to change accounting policies as to increase future 
reported earnings. It is consistent with bonus plan hypothesis of positive accounting 
theory (PAT). Healy (1985) reports that the sample firms which modify their bonus 
plans actually make more accounting policies changes. It supports that managers 
actually practice earnings management through changing accounting policies. 
However, the accounting policies change is not found to be used by managers to 
influence individual annual reported earnings in Healy's sample firms. He thus 
suggests that, as a technique, accounting policy change is not as effective and 
flexible as accruals and that accounting policy change is not suitable to be used for 
earnings management in short term as accruals does, while it is more desirable to be 
adopted by managers for long-run earnings management purpose.  
 
Finally, manipulating firms' real transactions can be a practice for managers to reach 
specific target. In the paper of Roychowdhury (2006), real transactions earnings 
manipulation is interpreted as managers' actions which diverge from firms' ordinary 
business activities for the purpose of achieving certain earnings target .  
 
Prior literatures investigate mainly three real activities manipulation methods. The 
first one is cutting R&D expenditure, which is frequently used by managers as to 
report higher earnings. Dechow and Sloan (1991) provide evidence that firms' CEOs 
cut R&D expenditure in the period close to the end of their tenure as to uplift 
short-run earnings. Consistent with that, Bushee (1998) also offer evidence that firms 
reduce R&D spending to achieve earnings target. The second one is boosting sales 
temporarily by offering price discounts to customers to increase short-term earnings. 
The third one is overproducing products to record more overhead into inventory in 
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the balance sheet and thus report lower cost of goods sold in the income statement. 
Roychowdhury (2006) tests all the three manipulation methods above and provide 
the evidence that managers actually manipulate real activities through these methods 
to avoid reporting losses. 
 
However, there exist bad sides for the firms if managers practice earnings 
management through manipulating real activities. Researchers argue that the 
manipulations of real activities for the short-term earnings reporting purpose 
sacrifice the future value of the firm because manipulations undertaken to increase 
current earnings will lead to less good or bad performance of firms' future cash flows. 
For instance, offering intensive price discounts to customers can boost sales volumes 
in the short term, while it may rise the difficulty for firms to raise price again in the 
future period and thus reduce firms' future cash inflow from sales activities. 
Overproducing products generate both excess inventories and more costs related to 
hold inventory for the firms. 
 
Bruns and Merchant (1990) and Graham et al. (2005) survey firms' financial 
executives and find that these executives prefer to manipulate earnings via real 
activities rather than accruals. Roychowdhury (2006) offers two possible reasons to 
that. On the one hand, auditors and regulators may tend to maintain more prudence 
over accruals than firms' real business activities, such as undertaking. Executives 
therefore may choose to manipulate earnings upwards through undertaking sales 
promotion or producing more products. On the other hand, firms can not only depend 
on manipulating accruals to achieve financial targets and thus manipulating real 
activities offers another choice for managers. 
 
Nevertheless, manipulation of real activities is seen as the least desirable technique 
for earning management practices (Fields et al. 2001). As Healy (1985) notes that 
controlling accruals and changing accounting policies are two main approaches 
applied by managers to manage earnings. 
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3.3.2 Patterns of Earnings Management 
 
As we discussed in previous section, managers have various incentives to manipulate 
earnings. Here we analyze four main patterns for earnings management based on 
Scott (2003, 383) and offer some related findings from Healy (1985). 
 
Scott (2003) identifies four patterns of earnings management. Firstly, so called "take 
a bath" may arise in the cases of, for instance, when firms are in face of corporate 
reorganizations, including the change of CEO, or when firms experience a severe 
economic depression period. To take a bath means that managers intend to record 
very large losses at one time into one accounting period to "clear the table" through 
accruals vehicle. For example, managers may write off large amounts of bad debts or 
obsoleted inventories at one time. By recording big losses in the current period, 
managers can save earnings for the future accounting periods. Healy (1985) states 
that managers may choose to take a bath when earnings of firms fall below bogey 
because it will increase their expected future bonuses.  
 
Secondly, the pattern of income minimization often is adopted by managers when, 
for example, firms are exposed to political issues. As we discussed in the previous 
section, political considerations can result in managers' incentives for earnings 
management. In particular, firms of large size or with high prosperity or in the 
monopolistic industry are motivated to minimize their net income by adopting some 
accounting policies, for example using accelerating depreciation method rather than 
straight line method, or expensing R&D rather than capitalizing it, or choosing LIFO 
for inventory valuation in the inflation period. By doing so, firms can either reduce 
their political cost or benefit from political process.  
 
Thirdly, the pattern of income maximization usually serves managers for their bonus 
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purpose or for the incentive to avoid violating covenants. Managers may be 
encouraged to maximize the current reported earnings when the earnings fall 
between the range of bogey and cap of their bonus scheme. On the other hand, to 
reduce the risk of violating covenants, managers are also motivated to maximize the 
current reported earnings. 
 
The final pattern is income smoothing. Income smoothing means to average earnings 
over accounting periods as to reduce earnings' volatility. From financial reporting 
perspective, income smoothing can play a role of transmitting firms' inside 
information to outside information users, such as investors as to communicate the 
predicted persistency of firms' reported earnings to them. From the performance 
measurement perspective, income smoothing can increase managers' job security 
given that it enables managers to avoid reporting too low earnings in bad years. We 
can infer from Healy (1985) that managers have motivations to smooth earnings and 
maintain it within the range of bogey and cap to avoid lost of their bonuses. In 
addition, to reduce the possibility of violating covenants in debt contracts or to 
attempt to reduce borrowing cost by showing lenders a persistent earnings power, 
manager are encouraged to alleviate the volatility of earnings through income 
smoothing. 
 
3.4 Accrual-Based Earnings Management 
 
As we discussed in the last section, accruals and accounting policies changes are two 
primary vehicles applied by managers for earnings management purpose. While the 
former one is more desirable and frequently used by managers than the latter. As 
Healy (1985) states, accounting policy changes as an opportunistic earnings 
management technique is not as preferable to managers as accruals. In other words, 
accruals is a more effective and pervasive technique than accounting policies 
changes for earnings management practice.  
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3.4.1 Accruals and Earnings Management 
 
As Sloan (1996) interprets, the earnings can be decomposed into operating cash flow 
component and accrual component. Accruals thus can be defined as the difference 
between earnings reported in income statement and cash flow from operations 
reported in the cash flow statement (Penman, 2004,123). Net accruals is composed of 
depreciation and amortization expenses and net changes in non-cash working capital 
such as account receivable and payable, inventory, bad debt allowance, etc.  
          
Total accruals can be further decomposed into non-discretional accruals and 
discretionary accruals by prior literatures. (e,g Healy, 1985; DeAngelo, 1986; Jones, 
1991; Subramanyam, 1996; Xie, 2001). Accruals that managers do not have 
flexibility and can not exert discretions to influence the amounts, at least in the short 
term, are regarded as non-discretional accruals. Depreciation and Amortization 
expense is a typical example of non-discretionary accruals. In contrast, accruals that 
managers have some flexibilities and can exert certain discretions to influence the 
amounts fall into the category of discretional accruals. The accounting items, such as 
account receivables, accounts payables, inventory, provision for bad debt and 
warranty allowance are examples for discretionary accruals.  
 
Managers often practice earnings management through accruals vehicle to influence 
reported earnings in the short term. Through accruals, managers can shift earnings 
from future accounting period to current accounting period or to defer earnings from 
current period to future period. However, due to the iron law of accrual reversal, the 
current earnings-increasing accruals will reverse ultimately and therefore reduce the 
earnings in the subsequent accounting period. In contrast, the earnings-decreasing 
accruals will increase firms' future earnings when it reverses. Thus, if managers have 
the incentives to manage earnings upwards and attempt to maintain it, then they have 
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to create more positive accruals in the subsequent period, otherwise the earnings will 
decline as the reversal of accruals in the following period. However, since managers 
can not postpone the reversal day of accruals in an everlasting way, accruals 
therefore are more used to influence firms' short-term reporting accounting numbers. 
 
It would be more difficult for investors, auditors and regulators to detect accrual- 
based earnings management. Managers have sufficient discretions to manipulate 
earnings within the rules of Accounting standards (e,g GAAP) while investors or 
regulators can not easily identify it. Schipper (1989) argues that it is even difficult for 
the board of directors to detect the earnings management which is exercised through 
accruals. For example, if a firm increases its account receivables, it is hard to 
distinguish whether this increase is caused only by a normal increase in firms' 
business volumes or by managers' discretions to accrue more receivables purposely 
at the end of the year, via for instance, a more generous credit policy to keep the 
book open at the end of the year. The former case pertains to non-discretionary 
accruals, while the latter one pertains to discretionary accruals. 
 
3.4.2 Accruals Methodologies to Detect Earnings Management 
 
Methodological problem arises in the earnings management studies, that is how to 
measure earnings management. "Discretionary accruals and earnings management 
are used synonymously in the literature." (Kothari et al., 2001). Prior earnings 
management literatures use discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings 
management (e,g Lara, et al. 2005, Pae 2007). Beginnings with Healy (1985), a 
variety of methodologies for measuring accruals are developed by researchers. I will 
give a review of five commonly used accrual models in the literature in this 
sub-section. 
 
The general process of measuring discretional accruals starts from total accruals, and 
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then non-discretional accruals component is estimated by applying a certain 
estimation model. Finally, the discretionary accruals component is assumed to be the 
residual after deducting the non-discretionary accruals component from the total 
accruals. (Dechow et al., 1995). 
 
Healy (1985) investigates a contracting incentive for earnings management. Based on 
bonus plan hypothesis, he predicts that managers may have incentives to 
opportunistically manage earnings as to benefit themselves the most under their 
bonus plan. He proposes an estimation model, which uses the mean total accruals 
over the estimation period as an estimation for non-discretionary accruals with the 
assumption that no earnings management is expected over the estimation period, 
However, as an time-series estimation model, the assumptions raise measurement 
errors. Equation (2) presents the Healy model: 
 
T
ATACC
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                                      (2) 
 
Where t denotes for years in the estimated period and denotes for years in the event 
period; TACC is total accruals; NACC is estimated non-discretionary accruals; A  
is total assets at the end of the previous fiscal year. 
 
DeAngelo (1986) proposes an estimation model for examining earnings management. 
In her estimation model, last period's total accruals is used to proxy for the 
non-discretionary accruals under the assumption that no earnings management is 
expected in the last period. Equation (3) presents DeAngelo model: 
             
1 tt TACCNACC                                             (3)   
 
DeAngelo's Model can be seen as a special case of Healy's Model. As Dechow et al. 
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(1995) states, "if nondiscretionary accruals are constant over time and discretionary 
accruals have a mean of zero in the estimation period, then both the Healy and 
DeAngelo Models will measure nondiscretionary accruals without errors." 
 
Jones (1991) develops a more refined estimation model to estimate non-discretionary 
accruals. Similar to Healy and DeAngelo models, Jones model is a time-series 
estimation model, however, it releases the assumption that non-discretionary accruals 
is constant over the estimation period and thus it estimates the non-discretionary 
accruals more accurately than the previous models. Thus Jones models are widely 
accepted by researchers and considered as the best existing accruals estimation 
methodology. Equation (4) presents the Jones Model: 
 
itititiititiiitit APPEAREVATACC    )/()/(/ 12111               (4) 
 
Where i and t denote the firm and year respectively; TACC  is the total accruals; A  
is total assets at the end of the previous fiscal year ; REV is changes in revenues 
and is used to control for non-discretionary accruals of changes in working capital, 
given that these changes rely on changes in firms' business activities measured by 
revenue; PPE is gross property, plant and equipment and is used to control for the 
non-discretional accruals of depreciation and amortization expenses, given that it 
relies on firms' fixed assets;  is the residual that captures all effects on TACC  
other than those from REV and PPE ; i , i1 , i1  are firm-specific parameters 
which are to be estimated from the regression model.   
 
The estimated parameters 
i , i1 , i1 are derived from the regression model 
presented by Equation (4). Thus discretional accruals are estimated as Equation (5) 
presents: 
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)//(// 121111   titititiitittit APPEAREVATACCADACC         (5) 
 
Where DACC  represents discretionary accruals. 
 
Dechow et al. (1995) further provide a modified Jones Model with the attempt to 
eliminate the measurement errors which result from the discretions exerted on 
revenues. They release the implicit assumption that revenues are non-discretionary in 
Jones model. Equation (6) presents the modified Jones Model: 
 
itititiititititiiitit APPEARECAREVATACC    )/()//(/ 121111   (6) 
 
Where i and t denote the firm and year respectively; REC is the net receivables for 
firm i in year t less in year t-1. 
 
As Dechow et al. (1995) states, the only difference between the modified model and 
the original one is that the modified model makes an adjustment of changes in 
receivables REC  to the variable REV  in the event period. In other words, the 
modified model assumes that the changes in receivables ( REC ) in the event period 
are attributable to the earnings management. They base the assumption on the 
grounds that it is easier to manage earnings through sales in credit than sales in cash 
in the recognition of revenues. 
 
The final estimated model, provided by Dechow and Sloan (1991) is the Industry 
Model. With the assumption that non-discretionary accruals are similar across the 
firms in the same industry, this model regresses the non-discretionary accruals on the 
median value of total accruals of the firms in the same industry to estimate the firm's 
specific parameters in the estimation period. Equation (7) presents the Industry 
Model: 
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Where )(TACCMEDIAN I represents the median value of total accruals for all 
non-sample firms in the same industry; A  is total assets at the end of the previous 
fiscal year; 
1 , 2 are firm-specific estimated parameters. 
 
In the empirical part of my thesis, I follow Jones model to estimate discretional 
accruals, which serves as a proxy for earnings management. I will provide further 
description of this methodology in research design part of my thesis. 
 
4 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
4.1 Conditional Accounting Conservatism and Earnings Management 
As I discussed in section 3.2, capital market incentive, contracting incentive and 
political incentive are main incentives for earnings management. These incentives 
may lead either to managers' income-decreasing earning management practices or to 
managers' income-increasing earnings management practices. Then the question is 
whether and how the two forms of earnings management practices influence firms' 
earnings conservatism.  
 
On the one hand, managers engage in income-decreasing earnings management 
considering there exist two main incentives. First, bonus contracts induce managers 
to manipulate earings downwards when the earnings fall below the bogey or above 
the cap of the bonus contracts. Second, when firms are in face of political cost, 
managers are motivated to manipulate earnings downwards and defer it to the future 
accounting period to either reduce political cost or benefit firms from political 
process. As to reduce reported earnings, managers therefore are more likely to 
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accelerate the recognition of bad news in earnings than good news through exerting 
discretions over accruals or accounting policies changes. Considering the effect of 
this earnings management practice on firms' earnings conservatism, this action 
actually abuses the accounting conservatism principle and the tendency to report 
lower earnings actually create "an additional undesirable conservatism". Put another 
way, the income-decreasing earnings management practice actually influences firms' 
earnings conservatism by biasing the degree of firms' earnings conservatism 
upwards.  
 
On the other hand, managers engage in income-increasing earnings management due 
to two main incentives. First, bonus contracts motivate managers to report higher 
earnings when the earnings fall between the bogey and cap of their bonus schemes. 
Second, debt contracts motivate managers to report higher current earnings when 
firms are close to the violation of debt covenants. To maximize their bonuses or to 
avoid violating debt covenants and thus reduce firms' default risk, managers may 
speed up the recognition of gains (good news) in earnings while defer the recognition 
of losses( bad news) in earnings or even do not report losses through exerting 
discretion over accruals or accounting polies changes. Considering the impact of this 
earnings management practice has on firms' earnings conservatism, this action 
actually impairs the accounting conservatism principle and the tendency to report 
higher earnings actually affects firms' earnings conservatism by biasing the degree of 
firms' earnings conservatism downwards.  
 
Hanna (2002) suggests the earnings management explanation for earnings 
conservatisms. He argues that Basu (1997)'s findings about earnings conservatisms 
can be explained by earnings management and he point out that "big baths" and 
"cookie jar reserves" can be used by managers to manipulate current reported 
earnings downwards as to increase reported earnings in the future period. This 
income-decreasing earnings management would increases their future compensations 
which are tied to reported earnings, or increases firms' stock price by misleading 
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investors. 
 
Lara, et al. (2005) investigate the variations of earnings management's effect on the 
measure of earnings conservatism across the different institutional contexts (common 
law context and code law context). Consistent with Basu (1997), they define the 
earnings conservatism as the asymmetric timeliness in recognition of bad news 
relative to good news and examine earnings conservatisms of common-law based 
countries (UK ) and code-law based countries (France and Germany) basing on Basu 
(1997)'s regression model. The empirical result shows that discretionary accruals in 
code-law based countries has a significant association with bad news, biasing 
upwards the incremental bad news coefficient (
1 ), which is a measure of earnings 
conservatism in Basu (1997) regression model. After controlling the discretionary 
accruals, then the sensitivity of earnings responses to bad news decreases 
significantly. The result implies that earnings management, which can be measured 
by discretionary accruals, actually affects the degree of firms' earnings conservatism 
in the code-law based countries. Lara, et al.(2005) attribute the result to the reason 
that managers of the code-law based countries have incentives to manipulate 
earnings downwards and offer explanations for this income-decreasing earnings 
management practice. Their argument that managers have incentives to manage 
earnings downwards in the code-law based countries also explains why the evidences 
of prior literatures show little variations in the degree of earnings conservatism 
across different legal regimes (code-law and common-law). 
 
4.2 Earnings Management Impacts Conditional Conservatism through Accruals 
 
As we discussed in 3.4.1, the earnings can be decomposed into operating cash flow 
component and accruals component. Thus if accounting is conservative, 
conservatisms must be reflected in both cash flow component and accruals 
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adjustment. As Basu (1997) states, accruals enable the asymmetric timeliness of 
recognizing unrealized losses relative to unrealized gains. Since unrealized losses 
influence current reported earnings but do not influence current cash flow, while 
unrealized gains do not influence both of them, it can be inferred that earnings is 
more conservative than cash flow. Basu's statement implies that accruals can be used 
by managers to implement accounting conservatism. However, relatively little prior 
earning management literatures place emphasis on the effect accruals have on 
conditional conservatism. (Pae, 2007).  
 
Pae (2007) examines whether managers' discretion over accrual influence conditional 
conservatism. He decomposes total accruals into non-discretionary component and 
discretionary component and tests the impact both accrual components have on 
conditional conservatism. Empirical evidence shows that it is the discretionary 
component that mainly contributes to conditional conservatism. 
 
In conclusion, in my thesis, I attempt to explore and empirically examine the impact 
earnings management has on earnings conservatisms. I use negative discretionary 
accruals to proxy for income-decreasing earnings management and positive 
discretionary accruals to proxy for income-increasing earnings management. The 
incremental bad news effect in Basu (1997) earnings regression model is used to 
measure the degree of firms' earnings conservatism. I predict that in Basu (1997) 
regression model, the incremental coefficient on bad news (
1 ) for 
income-decreasing sub-sample firms is higher than that of full sample firms and that 
the incremental coefficient on bad news for income-increasing sub-sample firms is 
lower than that of full sample firms. I therefore hypothesize: 
 
H1: Income-decreasing earnings management biases the degree of earnings 
conservatism upwards. 
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H2: Income-increasing earnings management biases the degree of earnings 
conservatism downwards. 
 
In addition, I argue that the firms which engage in income-decreasing earnings 
management tend to be more conservative than the firms which engage in 
income-increasing earnings management. To examine whether the degree of earnings 
conservatism is significantly different between the income-decreasing sub sample 
firms and income-increasing sub sample firms, I incorporate a dummy variable,
itS , 
which differentiate two sub samples, into Basu (1997) regression model to form a 
new combined regression model ( more detailed interpretation about the combined 
regression model will be given in next chapter). In the combined regression model, 
coefficient
3 captures the incremental earnings' response to bad news for negative 
discretionary accruals sub sample firms. 
3 is predicted to be positive, which 
indicates that the degree of earnings conservatism is greater for the 
income-decreasing sub sample firms than for the income-increasing sub sample 
firms. 
 
5 RESEARCH DESIGN 
5.1 Measure of Earnings Management 
 
Following prior earnings management literature (e,g. Lara et al., 2005, Pae, 2007). I 
use discretionary accruals to proxy for earnings management. The discretionary 
accruals is estimated through Jones (1991) accruals model.  
 
Following Dechow et al. (1995), I compute total accruals as the sum of depreciations 
and net change in working capital, scaled by average total assets. The mathematic 
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equation is presented as follows: 
 
11 /])()[(/   ttttttttt ADepTPSTDCLCashCAATACC      (8) 
 
Where t denotes the year. TACC  represents the total accruals; CA is the change in 
current assets; Cash  is the change in cash and cash equivalents; CL is the 
change in current liabilities; STD is the change in debt included in current liabilities; 
TP is the change in income taxes payable; Dep is depreciation and amortization 
expense; A  is the total assets at the end of the previous fiscal year. 
 
Total accruals can be decomposed into non-discretionary accruals ( NACC ) and 
discretionary accruals( DACC ). Discretionary accruals is therefore the residual after 
subtracting non-discretionary accruals from total accruals. Equation (9) presents the 
mathematic relation among TACC , NACC and DACC .  
 
NACCTACCDACC                                         (9) 
 
Specifically, I calculate sample firms' discretionary accruals following two steps. 
First, I apply Jones (1991) accrual model to total accruals. Equation (4) in 3.4.2 has 
presented Jones Model: 
 
itititiititiiitit APPEAREVATACC    )/()/(/ 12111             (4) 
 
Where i and t denote the firm and year respectively; TACC  is the total accruals; A  
is total assets at the end of the previous fiscal year; REV is changes in revenues 
and is used to control for non-discretionary accruals of changes in working capital, 
given that these changes rely on changes in firms' business activities measured by 
revenue; PPE is gross property, plant and equipment and is used to control for the 
non-discretional accruals of depreciation and amortization expenses, given that it 
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relies on firms' fixed assets;   is the residual that captures all effects on TACC  
other than those from REV and PPE ; i , i1 , i1  are firm-specific parameters 
which are to be estimated from the regression model.   
 
Second, I use the estimated parameters, 
i , i1 , i1 ,which are derived from the 
Equation (4) to estimate the non-discretionary accruals component of total accruals. 
The discretionary accruals component is therefore the residual from subtracting the 
non-discretionary accruals from total accruals. Equation (5) in 3.4.2 has presented 
how discretionary accruals is calculated: 
 
)//(// 121111   titititiitittit APPEAREVATACCADACC         (5) 
 
According to the sign of firms' discretionary accruals, I partition the full sample 
firms into two sub-samples. Firms which get negative discretionary accruals is 
categorized into income-decreasing earnings management sub-sample and firms 
which get positive discretionary accruals fall into income-increasing earnings 
management sub-sample.  
 
5.2 Measure of Earnings Conservatism 
 
Following Basu (1997), I interpret earnings conservatism as more timely earnings 
recognition in bad news than in good news. The incremental coefficient on bad 
news,
1 , in Basu (1997) regression model is used to measure the degree of sample 
firms' earnings conservatism. Using unexpected negative stock return to proxy for 
bad news and unexpected positive stock return to proxy for good news, I regress 
sample firms' annual earnings, deflated by beginning-of-period stock price, on 
current annual stock returns to examine sample firms' earnings conservatisms. 
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Equation (1) in 2.2 has presented Basu's regression model: 
 
itititititit RDRRDRPX  10101/                            (1) 
    
Where i and t denote the firm and year respectively. X  is the earnings per share, 
P  is the price per share at the end of the previous fiscal year, R  is stock return, 
itDR  is an indicator variable, which take the value 1 if R is negative and take the 
value 0 otherwise. Slope coefficient
1 captures the incremental bad news effect on 
earnings and indicates the degree of earnings conservatisms in the regression model. 
 
To test my hypotheses, I first run the Basu (1997) regression model on the full 
sample firms and then re-run it on each sub-samples respectively. I compare the 
degree of earnings conservatisms of each sub-sample firms with that of full sample 
firms respectively. The incremental coefficient on bad news(
1 ) for 
income-decreasing sub-sample firms is predicted to be positive and higher than that 
of full sample firms, which implies that there exists an upwards bias in earnings 
conservatism in income-decreasing sub-sample firms. While the incremental 
coefficient on bad news (
1 ) for income-increasing sub-sample firms is predicted to 
be positive and lower than that of full sample firms, which implies that there exists a 
downwards bias in earnings conservatism in income-increasing sub-sample firms. 
 
Second, to examine whether the degree of earnings conservatism is significantly 
different between the income-decreasing sub sample firms and income-increasing 
sub sample firms, I create a dummy variable, itS , which is set equal 1 if the sign of 
discretionary accruals of the sample firm is negative, set equal 0 otherwise. I 
incorporate itS  into Basu (1997) regression model and run the combined regression 
model as Equation (10) presents: 
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ititititit
ititititititititit
SRDRSR
SDRSRDRRDRPX


32
3210101
                 
/


     (10) 
                                                           
Coefficient 
3  captures the difference of earnings' response to bad news between 
the sample firms with negative discretionary accruals and the sample firms with 
positive discretionary accruals. 
3  is predicted to be positive, which indicates that 
the income-decreasing sub-sample firms response more strongly to bad news than the 
income-increasing sub-sample firms do. Coefficient 
2  captures the difference of 
earnings' response to good news between the sample firms with negative 
discretionary accruals and the sample firms with positive discretionary accruals. It is 
predicted to be negative, which indicates that the income-decreasing sub-sample 
firms response less sensitively to good news than the income-increasing sub-sample 
firms do.  
 
6 EMPIRICAL RESULT 
6.1 Sample Selection, Data, and Descriptive Statistics 
The sample includes all firms listing on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stock 
markets over the period 1950-2010. Financial statement data, stock return data and 
firms' market values data are obtained from the CRSP US Stock Databases. The 
following data items for firm i, year t are required in my empirical analysis: stock 
return( R ), earnings( X ),change in sales( REV ), property, plant and 
equipment( PPE ), change in current assets( CA ), change in cash and cash 
equivalents( Cash ), change in current liabilities( CL ), change in debt included in 
current liabilities( STD ), change in income tax payable( TP ) minus depreciation 
and amortization expense( DEP ). The original sample includes 176,362 firm-year 
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observations. I first delete the observations missing the data items I require and then I 
eliminate the top and bottom percentile from each tail of variables' distributions. The 
final sample consists a total of 150,323 firm-year observations. the descriptive 
statistics of key variables are presented in Table 1, of which Panel A presents the 
result for the full sample and panel B presents the result for two sub-samples: 
negative discretionary accruals sub-sample which consists of 71,037 observations 
and positive discretionary accruals sub-sample which consists of 79,286 
observations. 
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of key variables 
Panel A: full sample-150,323 observations
Variable Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum
R 0.125 0.055 0.553 -0.857 3.082 
X 0.018 0.057 0.209 -1.605 0.563 
NACC -0.031 -0.031 0.033 -0.177 0.109 
DACC 0.000 0.004 0.083 -0.498 0.422 
Panel B: Negative discretionary accruals versus Positive discretionary accruals
Negative DACC(71,037 observations) Positive DACC(79,286 observations)
Variable Mean Median Mean Median
R 0.134 0.054 0.117 0.055 
X -0.017 0.044 0.050 0.066 
NACC -0.030 -0.031 -0.033 -0.032 
DACC -0.063 -0.043 0.056 0.040 
 
Notes: R is stock return; earnings( X ) is scaled by stock price at the end of the previous fiscal 
year. Discretionary accruals (DACC) and non-discretionary accruals (NDACC), scaled by total 
assets at the end of the previous fiscal year, are estimated by Jones (1991) accrual model. (how 
they are estimated has been discussed in section 5.1 and estimation results refer to Table 2). 
 
We can see from panel A, for the full sample, consistent with prior earnings 
management literature, the mean of discretionary accruals in our full sample is close 
to zero. The standard deviation of earnings (0.209) is smaller than stock return 
(0.553), which is in line with the argument that earnings is a function of past and 
present stock return (Ball et al., 2000). Panel B reveals that, for negative 
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discretionary accruals sub sample, the mean discretionary accruals is -0.063 and the 
mean earnings is -0.017, which is also negative. On the other hand, the mean 
discretionary accruals for positive discretionary accruals sub sample is 0.056 and the 
mean earnings for this sub sample is 0.050, which is also positive.  
 
6.2 Result Analysis 
Table 2 reports the estimation results of annual cross-sectional regressions of Jones 
(1991) model for the full sample (150,323 firm-year observations) over the period 
1950-2010. The coefficient estimates on change in sales ( REV ) is 0.101 and The 
coefficient estimates on for property, plant and equipment ( PPE ) is -0.050. Both 
coefficients estimated parameters are significant at the level of 0.01. Consistent with 
prior studies, both coefficient estimates show the expected signs: the coefficient 
estimate on change in sales is significantly positive and the coefficient estimate for 
PPE is significantly negative. The adjusted 
2R  is 0.135. 
 
Table 2 Jones ( 1991) estimation results 
Model:
Definition:
Intercept -0.015***
 (-34.29) 
0.101***
 (123.11) 
-0.050***
 (-83.76) 
Adj R-Sq 0.135
itititiititiiitit APPEAREVATACC    )/()/(/ 12111
11 /])()[(/   ttttttttt ADepTPSTDCLCashCAATACC
1/  itit AREV
1/ itit APPE
Notes: 
1/  itit AREV  is the change in sales , scaled by total assets at the end of the previous fiscal 
year,  
1/ itit APPE  is property, plant and equipment, scaled by total assets at the end of the 
previous fiscal year. 
***indicates statistical significance at the 1% level (two tailed) 
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The main results of this study are presented in Table 3 and Table 4. Table 3 presents 
the regression results for Basu regression model. Of Table 3, Panel A reports the 
regression results of earnings on stock returns for the full sample, Panel B and Panel 
C report the regression results of earnings on stock returns for the negative 
discretionary accruals sub-sample and positive discretionary accruals sub-sample 
respectively. First, we can see from Table 3 that, 
0  and 1  are both significantly 
positive at 0.01 level for the full sample and also for the two sub samples, the results 
are in line with prior studies. The degree of earnings conservatisms is captured by the 
slope coefficient
1 , which measures the incremental bad news effect on earnings. 
Consistent with Basu (1997), the
1 s are 0.280, 0.315 and 0.197, significant at the 
0.01 level, for the full sample, negative discretionary accruals sub sample and 
positive discretionary accruals sub sample respectively.  
 
When we compare the 
1  for each sub samples with that for full sample, we obtain 
that the
1 for negative discretionary accruals sub sample is higher by 
12.5%( 12.5%=[(0.315-0.280)/0.280) than that for full sample, while the
1 for 
positive discretionary accruals sub sample is lower by around one third 
( 29.64%=[0.197-0.280]/0.280) than that for the full sample. The results are in line 
with my predictions that the incremental coefficient on bad news (
1 ) for 
income-decreasing sub-sample firms is higher than that for full sample firms and that 
the incremental coefficient on bad news for income-increasing sub-sample firms is 
lower than that for full sample firms. The results also imply that earnings is 
recognized more timely in bad news for the negative discretionary sample firms, 
while less timely for the positive discretionary sample firms.  
 
Table 3 Results from Basu (1997) regression model 
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Basu model:
Panel A: Full sample-150,323 observations
Adj 
0.063*** -0.014*** 0.004*** 0.280*** 0.101
(65.15) (-8.8) (3.16) (74.15)
Panel B:Negative discretionary accruals sub-sample-71,037 observations
0.041*** -0.027*** 0.005*** 0.315*** 0.112
(24.5) (-9.4) (2.01) (51.07)
Panel C:Positive discretionary accruals sub-sample-79,286 observations
0.079*** -0.011*** 0.011*** 0.197*** 0.086
(77.03) (-6.31) (6.89) (45.99)
 0  0  1
RDRRDRPX itititititit *10101/  
 1 R
2
 
Note: 
itX  is the annual earnings for firm i in fiscal year t, 1itP  is the stock price for firm i at the 
end of the previous fiscal year and 
itR  is the contemporaneous annual return on firm i. itDR  is 
a dummy variable, which set equals 1 if 
itR  is negative and set equals 0 otherwise. 
***indicates statistical significance at the 1% level (two tailed)  
 
Second, 
0 measures the earnings response to stock return in good news period.  
0 s are 0.004, 0.005 and 0.011, significant at the 0.01 level, for the full sample, 
negative discretionary accruals sub sample and positive discretionary accruals sub 
sample respectively. We note that
0 for the positive discretionary accruals sub 
sample is the highest among all cases. It implies that the earnings response to good 
news approximately three times (2.75=0.011/0.004) as much strongly for the 
income-increasing sub sample firms than for the full sample firms. The result could 
be explained by that the managers use positive discretionary accruals to conform the 
earnings and stock returns in good news period. (Guay et al, 1996; Lara et al., 2005) 
 
In addition, the adjusted 2R s for the full sample, negative discretionary accruals sub 
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sample and positive discretionary accruals sub sample are 0.101,0.112 and 0.086 
respectively. The results are also consistent with those reported in prior studies. It is 
noted that the adjusted 2R for negative discretionary accruals sub sample is slightly 
higher than that for full sample and positive discretionary accruals sample. This 
result could be attributable to that earnings contains more timely bad news 
information in negative discretionary accruals sub sample firms, resulting in a higher 
adjusted 2R . It is in line with Basu (1997)' prediction of higher adjusted 2R for bad 
news firms. 
 
Table 4 Results from combined regression model 
Regression model:
Full sample-150,323 observations
0.079*** -0.011*** 0.011*** 0.197*** -0.038*** -0.016*** -0.006*** 0.117*** 0.127
(61.39) (-5.03) (5.49) (36.65) (-19.92) (-4.80) (-2.30) (15.70)
 0 
0

1
1 R Adj
2

2

3
 3
itititititititititititititit SRDRSRSDRSRDRRDRPX  323210101/ 
 2
 
Note: S is a dummy variable, set equal 1 if the sign of discretionary accruals of the sample firm is 
negative, set equal 0 otherwise. 
***indicates statistical significance at the 1% level (two tailed)  
 
Table 4 presents the regression results for the combined regression model in which 
dummy variable itS is incorporated. In the combined regression model, 3 captures 
the difference of earnings' response to bad news between the sample firms with 
negative discretionary accruals and the sample firms with positive discretionary 
accruals. Consistent with the predicted signs, we can see from Table 4, 3 gets the 
positive value of 0.117, 
2  gets the negative value of -0.006. They both are 
significant at the level of 1%. The earnings response to bad news approximately one 
and a half times (1.6=[0.197+0.117]/0.197) as much strongly for the 
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income-decreasing sub sample firms than for the income-increasing sub sample firms. 
2  captures the difference of earnings' response to good news between the sample 
firms with negative discretionary accruals and the sample firms with positive 
discretionary accruals. The sensitivity of earnings' response to good news for 
income-decreasing sub sample firms is only less than half times 
(0.5=[0.011-0.006]/0.011) that for income-increasing sub sample firms. The results 
derived from this combined regression model imply that the firms which engage in 
income-decreasing earnings management are more conservative than the firms which 
engage in income-increasing earnings management.   
 
In sum, I partition the full sample firms into negative discretionary accruals sub 
sample firms and positive discretionary accruals sub sample firms and test the degree 
of firms' earnings conservatism for the three cases. The empirical results show: (1) In 
Basu's regression model, the negative discretionary accruals sub sample obtains the 
higher incremental coefficient on bad news (
1 ) than the full sample does, while the 
negative discretionary accruals sub sample obtains the lower incremental coefficient 
on bad news than the full sample does. (2) In the combined regression model, the 
estimated coefficient
3 , which captures the incremental earnings' response to bad 
news for negative discretionary accruals sub sample firms, is significantly positive. 
The results therefore are in line with my predictions and support my hypotheses. 
 
7 CONCLUSION 
Financial reporting supplies relevant financial information to investors to help them 
make investment decisions and also provides accounting measures for management 
performance evaluation purpose. However, the separation of control and ownership 
and information asymmetry generates the conflicts between managers and outside 
investors. Managers have obvious advantage of firms' inside information over 
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outside investors and other stakeholders. Accounting conservatism arises primarily to 
serve external parties such as investors, debtholders and standard or regulation setters 
to better govern or monitor firms' business operations. It protects investors and other 
stakeholders' interests by avoiding firms reporting overstated earnings, which may 
mislead investors or other stakeholders. One dimension of accounting conservatism 
is conditional accounting conservatism. It requires firms to recognize bad news in 
earnings more timely than good news. 
 
Managers are motivated to engage in earnings management mainly for three typical 
incentives, which are capital market incentive, contracting incentive and political 
incentive. They may manipulate earnings upwards as to increase firms' share price or 
to avoid violate debt covenants, or to maximize their bonuses which are tied to 
earnings. on the other hand, they may manage earnings downwards as to mitigate 
political cost. Accruals act as an effective and pervasive vehicle for managers to 
practice earnings management. Specially, discretionary accruals is utilized for 
managing earnings because this component of accruals is more flexible to exercise 
by managers and is also difficult to detect by investors and other outside financial 
information users. Through accruals, managers can manipulate current earnings 
upwards by accelerating recognition in current earnings or manipulate earnings 
downwards by deferring earnings from current accounting period to future 
accounting period.  
 
This study intend to explore the relation between conditional conservatism and 
earnings management and empirically examine the impact earnings management has 
on conditional conservatism (earnings conservatism). I hypothesize that 
income-decreasing earnings management biases the degree of earnings conservatism 
upwards, while the income-increasing earnings management biases the degree of 
earnings conservatism downwards. I based my hypotheses on the argument that 
managers are more likely to accelerate the recognition of bad news in earnings than 
good news when they conduct income-decreasing earning management, however, 
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they are more likely to defer the recognition of bad news but speed up the 
recognition of good news when they conduct income-increasing earning management. 
The more tendency to recognize in bad news would bias the degree of firms' earnings 
conservatism upwards while the more tendency to recognize in good news would 
bias the degree of firms' earnings conservatism downwards. This argument lead to 
my prediction that the incremental coefficient on bad news (
1 ) in Basu (1997) 
earnings regression model is higher for income-decreasing sub-sample firms than 
that for full sample firms and that the incremental coefficient on bad news for 
income-increasing sub-sample firms is lower than that for full sample firms.  
 
To measure earnings management, I use negative discretionary accruals to proxy for 
income-decreasing earnings management and positive discretionary accruals to 
proxy for income-increasing earnings management. Jones (1991) accruals model is 
applied to estimate sample firms' discretionary accruals. I partition the full sample 
firms into two sub-samples according to the sign of firms' discretionary accruals. The 
firms with negative discretionary accruals are categorized into an income-decreasing 
earning management sub-sample, the firms with positive discretionary accruals fall 
into an income-increasing earnings management sub-sample. To examine the degree 
of firms' earnings conservatism, I run Basu (1997) earnings regression model on full 
sample firms and each sub-sample firms respectively to get estimated incremental 
bad news effect, which is captured by coefficient
1 . Then I compare the degree of 
earnings conservatism of each sub-sample firms with that of full sample firms to 
draw a conclusion. In line with my prediction, the empirical result shows that the 
negative discretionary accruals sub sample gets a higher incremental coefficient on 
bad news (
1 ) than the full sample does and the positive discretionary accruals sub 
sample gets a lower incremental coefficient on bad news than the full sample. 
 
In addition, I also argue that the firms which engage in income-decreasing earnings 
management tend to be more conservative than the firms which engage in 
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income-increasing earnings management. To examine whether the degree of earnings 
conservatism is significantly different between the income-decreasing sub sample 
firms and the income-increasing sub sample firms, I incorporate dummy variable,
itS , 
which differentiates two sub samples, into Basu (1997) regression model, and then 
run the combined regression model to get the estimated coefficient
3 , which 
captures the incremental earnings' response to bad news for income-decreasing sub 
sample firms. Consistent with my prediction, the regression results show that 
3  is 
significantly positive, which indicates that the degree of earnings conservatism is 
significantly greater for the income-decreasing sub sample firms than for the 
income-increasing sub sample firms. 
 
Based on the results, I draw the conclusion that firms' earnings management practice 
actually biases earnings conservatism and that the firms which engage in 
income-decreasing earnings management are more conservative than the firms which 
engage in income-increasing earnings management. However, the conclusion of this 
study should be considered cautiously because the methodology I apply in the 
empirical examination might bias the reality. On the one hand, the accrual model 
which I use to estimate the discretionary accruals is Jones model. Since it is just an 
estimation model, it is possible to generate biased estimated results and therefore 
affect the outcome of partitioning the full sample into two sub samples according to 
the sign of firms' discretionary accruals. On the other hand, I use the incremental bad 
news effect in Basu (1997) regression model to measure the degree of conditional 
conservatism. As a matter of fact, it would be hard to measure conditional 
conservatism accurately since in reality many factors may affect conditional 
accounting conservatism, for instance, the quality of accounting standards, the degree 
of unconditional conservatism etc. 
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